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Reviewed by Peer Zumbansen *
GLOBAL FORCES OF CORPORATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN
PATH-DEPENDENCIES
I.
Edited academic collections on topics that have entered the public
consciousness, well beyond scholarly circles, constitute a risk for the
editors, the authors and the publishers. In the fast-evolving world of
academic publishing, with its constant increase in paper-based and online
venues for disseminating expert knowledge, the status of a carefully
edited volume of substantial content and length remains ambiguous.
This explains why many pieces included in a volume like the one here
under review will have previously appeared in academic journals or,
often, as working papers on the omnipresent Social Science Research
Network. Why then take on in such a volume the task-as editor or,
indeed, as publisherof assembling previously published articles and of
soliciting further original work from some of the most renowned experts
in the field?
While

such general

observations

might

be prompted by the

appearance of a 700 page volume that convenes some of the leading
scholars in U.S. and European corporate law to assess the 2000 crash of
"Wall Street's darling," the Enron corporation, any doubts over the need
for this publication are quickly brushed aside once the volume is opened.

After Enron presents an excellent and timely collection of analyses of the
Enron debacle, provided by some of the most astute and informed
corporate law scholars, and masterfully integrated by two of the finest
academics in this field. The editors, John Armour and Joseph McCahery,
have succeeded in collecting, conceptualizing and organizing a most
comprehensive and intriguing collection of excellent writings on Enron
and its aftermath. Their book can aptly serve as either a first-blush or a
more in-depth analysis of the problems, for those conducting research as
well as those teaching in the area of corporate and securities law. Yet,
beyond this achievement, the editors also contribute importantly to a
literature which has for some time now emphasized the need to take a
deliberately comparative viewpoint when analyzing the trajectories of
corporate law development around the world. 1 This work has only more
recently begun to explore the existing differences in greater depth and
with a view to the historical, political and socio-economical context of
company law regulation.2 This move to a "deeper reading" of the
contextual

conditions

of the

regulatory

framework

of companies'

activities in advanced3 and developing nations4 is unlikely to be reversed
in the

near

future,

given

the

growing

awareness

that corporate

governance is irrevocably developing into a multi-layered body of
transnational law. Corporate and securities law rules form part of a
complex regulatory

environment,

which is historically

grown

and

continues to develop along co-evolutionary lines of official/unofficial,
hard/soft law legislation, and which involves modes of public and private

ordering with direct and indirect regulatory effects.5

II.
What was Enron? Emerging in the 1990s as an overwhelmingly
successful corporate actor with a keen sense for the transforming political
climate, marked by a forceful embrace of large-scale deregulation and
privatization policies, Enron emerged as arguably the smoothest player in a
fast unfolding energy trading game-until, in late 2001, its name became a
signifier

worldwide for

a plethora of regulatory failings, personal

misconduct and largest-scale financial and existential losses.6 Enron's fall
from the global capital market's grace was brought about by its
management's outrageous collaboration in reducing corporate assets and
misstating the company's financial status. Enron's dealings, which led to
wide-reaching

criminal prosecution,

have

been

among the

prime

homework-providers for corporate law regulators in just about every
jurisdiction worldwide. 7
Within the last few years, the U.S. Congress' 2002 SarbanesOxley
legislation (a.k.a. SOX) has become a formula for similarminded
corporate governance law reform worldwide.8 Today, as SOX attracts
criticism for allegedly unreasonably raising compliance costs,9 the Act's
Section 404 and other countries' similar regulations10 are under
heightened scrutiny. Section 404 requires the creation of extensive
policies and controls within public companies to secure, document,

process, and verify material information dealing with financial results.
Essentially, it requires that each annual report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission-overseeing "reporting companies" with at
least 300 shareholders and minimum assets of U.S. $500 million-contain
an internal control report. That report must detail management's
responsibility for establishing and implementing adequate procedures for
financial reporting, including an assessment of internal control structures
and procedures and disclosure of adopted codes of ethics. One of the
clearest signs of the Act's retaliatory nature is its requirement that a
company's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) personally certify the report's accuracy.
Interestingly enough, the Act's emphasis on individual, personal
misconduct is not precisely the focus of SOX's critics. Instead, they
target the law's creation of a compliance regime that is perceived as
burdensome, counterproductive and ineffective. To be sure, the degree
to which the issue of personal guilt of CEOs and CFOs remains within
the purview of ongoing corporate law reform, both professionally and in
popular discourse, is reflected for example in the attention given to
aspects of management remuneration, which alone has prompted a long
worldwide debate.11 And it is here where the contributions in Armour and
McCahery's volume constitute a much-needed and welcome advance in
the current debates over corporate governance. The authors of their
collection provide excellent insights into the much more complex

regulatory framework that constitutes corporate governance.

III.
The contributions to the volume are divided into four sections.
They are preceded by an introductory essay by the two editors, who take
on the ever more rarely assumed task of actually "editing" the work of
their contributors. Armour and McCahery provide a roadmap through the
volume by engaging with each of the chapters and placing them in the
context of the larger debates to which they contribute. This will help
particularly those readers who have no firm prior knowledge of the
Enron debacle or of the various regulatory responses, and those who
are particularly interested in corporate law reform from a distinctly
comparative perspective. Given the predominantly Anglo-Saxon focus of
much of the volume, it succeeds in mapping and further facilitating a
dialogue, a dialogue no longer merely between scholars of different
jurisdictions,

but also between differently conceived and evolved

regulatory cultures.
The first of the four sections of the book, "Stock Markets and
Information," contains two articles, the first by Ronald Gilson and Reinier
Kraakman and the second by Donald Langevoort, which inquire into the
emergence and reliability of traditional instruments evaluating a firm's
worth as the decisive signal to stock market investors. In light of the
inevitable rise of stock market capitalism in the United States and the

United Kingdom, and the pressure on stakeholder capitalist regimes such
as France, Germany and Japan, 12 the editors are correct in asking how
Enron could for so long hide its destructive dealings from the capital
market's "eye that sees all." Inviting two of the field's leading scholars to
build on their previous work on the role of stock market institutions in
soliciting, interpreting and disseminating information, and to pursue this
focus within the contemporary capital market environment, provides for
an intriguing overture to the book's inquiry. It is particularly helpful
because Gilson and Kraakman's article provides a sober view of how
much irrationality still exists in our attempts to read stock prices.
Langevoort's article, discussing various patterns of investor behavior,
adds to this picture of the uncertainty and irrationality that remain even
where in fact more information is available to investors. Both sections put
in context some of the basis for the regulatory retaliation, emphasizing
the need for better disclosure that took place after Enron.
The second section is dedicated to the exploration of "Corporate
Scandals in Historical and Comparative Context" and collects papers on
the United States (by David Skeel, Jr.), the United Kingdom (by Simon
Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann), and Italy (by Guido Ferrarini and
Paolo Giudici). These are followed by a summarizing evaluation of "Why
the US and

Europe

Differ" (by John Coffee).

This section's

contributions underscore the importance of seeing beyond the demands
of the day when responding to crisis.

In tracing the different aspects of various corporate scandals in the
investigated countries' history, the authors in this section illuminate key
connections in the way in which scandals were and are being perceived
and responded to. They succeed in raising some doubt as to the adequacy
of certain of the regulatory responses. This discussion

becomes

particularly interesting when the responses are reviewed in the context
of the specific corporate governance regime in which they unfold. It is
here where the differences between

shareholderand stakeholder-

oriented corporate governance regimes are apparently put to the test. If
scandals do indeed take place in either kind of regime, the analysis of
their scope and of the subsequent regulatory response speaks not only to
the concrete scandal but well beyond it, to the nature of the respective
corporate governance regimes. The authors' inquiry into the reasons why
measures to prevent corporate fraud often fail-taking the case of Italy,
for example, where rules even more stringent than SOX failed to
prevent fraud-ultimately reveals the great need for deeper comparative
work.
The chapters provide a powerful illustration of why discussions over
convergence versus divergence of corporate governance regimes will
eventually fail in the face of the particular dynamics of regulatory
change that we can observe in the various jurisdictions. While a first-cut
distinction between "outsider" and "insider" corporate governance
regimes is helpful in identifying some of the base variances in regulatory

design, 13 we need to direct our attention to the environment in which
corporate law regulation is unfolding. This environment involves a
transnational proliferation of norm authors and norm-setting sites,
changing political coalitions

14

and an intricate mix of regulatory

approaches. 15 It is from such a reformed investigative agenda that we
can hope to find more helpful answers to the conundra of Enron,
WorldCom, Parmalat, and other scandals.
The third section, entitled "Evaluating Regulatory Responses: The US
and UK," brings together papers by luminaries including Lucian Bebchuk
and William Bratton, among others. 16 It focuses on the SOX, particularly
on its regulatory aspirations as well as its blind spots and omissions.
Given its thematic orientation, this section might be taken as the most
short-lived in light of its concrete engagement with specific elements of an
evolving regulatory regime. Yet the individual papers reach beyond their
contemporary confines, either by building on existing research agendas
and discussions or by unfolding forward-looking ones. To take an
example, Lucian Bebchuk's paper forms part of his recent proposals to
strengthen shareholder rights within the corporation. Likewise, the paper
by William Bratton contributes to an ongoing discussion over the
rulesversus principle-based approach in designing accounting rules.
The final, fourth section of the volume, which takes up more than a
third of the book's space, is entitled "Reforming EU Company Law and
Securities Regulation." It constitutes a perfect orchestration of the most
interesting voices in the current discussion in Europe. It is this part of

the book that arguably carries the greatest weight in deepening the
transatlantic dialogue on corporate regulation. The chapters-authored by
Paul Davies, Klaus Hopt, John Armour, Gerard Hertig and Joseph
McCahery, Eilis Ferran and Luca Enriquesbring to the table the leading
voices in the current European Community (EC) company law reform
debate. What these authors shareand, again, this testifies to the editors'
conscious design of their book and to their commitment to telling a
coherent story-is a particular perspective on corporate law reform,
which is ultimately a perspective on the corporation itself.
All of the authors in this section have in various ways been
personally involved in advisory or even law proposal commissions within
the EC in recent years, and are thus the last to be accused of being
na'ive of the challenges of corporate law reform. Yet their astute
understanding of the European intricacies of multilevel lawmaking and
negotiation 17 might also explain their reluctance to expose more clearly
the challenges that face a more fundamental inquiry into the greater political
goals of corporate law reform. Such an inquiry would inevitably have to
reconsider the broader role of business corporations in society if one accepts
the premise that corporate governance regulation encompasses a dynamic set
of rules and standards in different, yet intertwined areas of law. The book's
editors and their authors18 are well aware of this connection, clearly
expressed for example in Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann's chapter
(pp. 155-58). Yet their brief presence (that paper is a pithy four pages)
paradoxically also underlines the absence of another set of issues and

approaches, which the volume could profitably have alluded to and which
the editors could have sought to integrate in their collection.

Clive Schmitthoff, writing in 1973, provided a succinct and highly
sensitive account of the challenges facing corporate law reform in
Europe. 19 He already then pointed to the particular intricacies arising
for law reform from the complex political economy of an integrating
Europe. Europe-like Enron-is an enigma, a conundrum, a formula,
which always stands for more than a given observer can perceive. If one
thing is certain about European corporate governance reform, however,
it is its inseparability from the greater process of
European integration

and the relation of Europe to its global

environment.20 The coming years will show to which degree the
participants in the debate are able to reflect on the correlation between
policy choices and theoretical models to explain the business corporation.
It is certain, and the reviewed book is a much needed illustration of this
insight, that Europe is still in evolution and that the study of corporate
law reform is taking place in a vibrant, 24-7, open conceptual and
experimental laboratory.
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